The Demand for External Auditing: Size, Debt and Ownership Influences.
基于代理理论，分析企业为何自愿聘请外部审计，发现杠杆率、债务契约和公司规模会增加审计需求，而管理者持股比例则相反。对1926年165家NYSE和OTC公司的检验支持了杠杆和债务契约的假设。
Abstract ABSTRACT: This study uses an agency theory framework to analyze firms' incentives to hire external auditing. It postulates that a major reason for firms to hire this service is to help control the conflict of interests among firm managers, shareholders, and bond-holders. Firm characteristics which affect the severity of this conflict or the marginal cost of external auditing are expected to influence a firm's demand for this service. Based on this analysis, leverage, firm size, and number of accounting-based debt covenants are predicted to increase the probability that a firm will voluntarily hire external auditing. The firm manager's ownership share is predicted to have the opposite effect. Univariate and multivariate tests were conducted on a sample of 165 NYSE and OTC firms from the year 1926. The results generally supported the hypothesized effects of leverage and accounting-based debt covenants, and moderately supported the predicted role of firm size. Manager ownership effects could not be tested due to data problems.