Selection of Short-Term Accounting-Based Bonus Plans.
检验了企业为何选择不同会计指标（税后利润 vs 税前利润）来制定高管奖金，发现跨国程度和资本密集度越高的企业越倾向使用税后利润指标。
Abstract ABSTRACT: This paper tests two alternative hypotheses about why different firms choose different accounting measures of performance when determining executive compensation. The two measures of performance examined are accounting profits after income taxes and accounting profits before income taxes. Empirical evidence weakly suggests that the greater the degree to a firm is multinational, the more likely it is to use bonus plans that reward the manager on the basis of after-tax profits, as opposed to before-tax profits. The empirical evidence also suggests that the more capital intensive a firm is, the more likely it is to use bonus plans that reward the manager on the basis of after-tax profits.