Public Goods, Common Inputs, and the Efficiency of Full Allocations.
研究多部门企业中共同投入的配置与成本分摊问题，区分纯共同投入与纯私人投入，证明完全成本分配可实现纯共同投入的有效配置，但搭便车问题使这一结果难以实现，且基于博弈论的分配方案可能无效。
Abstract ABSTRACT: This paper addresses the simultaneous problems of determining input levels in a multidivisional firm and allocating the input costs to the divisions. A distinction analogous to that in economics between pure public goods and pure private goods is made between pure common inputs and pure private inputs. It is shown that for a pure common input, decentralization utilizing a full cost allocation can result in an efficient allocation of the input. Although efficient decentralization is possible in this case, the "free-rider problem" suggests that such an outcome is unlikely. In addition, it is shown that recently suggested allocation schemes based on game-theoretic concepts may not lead to an efficient allocation of pure common inputs.