Heterogeneous information provision and Bayesian effect for queues with strategic customers
研究在线评分信息对顾客排队决策的影响，发现异质信息下均衡到达率唯一，且有时让部分顾客获得更多信息反而有利于系统吞吐量。
The information signal from the online rating is a key ingredient in influencing the customers’ behaviour and the store’s operation. We consider a single-server queueing system with an uncertain service quality and a mixture of customers with no information and customers with imprecise signals from the online rating. Customers with no information make queueing decisions based on their prior beliefs, while those with imprecise signals update their beliefs by using obtained signals and Bayes’ rule, and then make their queueing decisions. We first characterise the customers’ equilibrium joining decisions, and then investigate the system’s metrics. We find that the customers’ equilibrium joining probabilities may be multiple, but the customers’ equilibrium arrival rate is always unique. Moreover, a larger potential arrival rate may not induce a higher equilibrium arrival rate of customers. Furthermore, under the heterogeneous information, the customers’ equilibrium arrival rate may not become worse off when some customers have access to more information about the service quality. Finally, we confirm that the heterogeneous-information strategy is sometimes more beneficial for the system manager to maximise the throughput. Moreover, for the signal with a high precision level, more information decreases the system’s throughput and increases the social welfare.