The Controllability Principle in Responsibility Accounting.
在委托代理框架下检验可控性原则，发现最优代理方案与可控性的直观定义无逻辑关联，而信息内容视角能提供更精确的可控性定义，与直觉和实践一致。
Abstract ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is to examine controllability: the notion a manager should be evaluated based on that which she or he controls. We embed the managerial evaluation problem in a principal-agent setting and ask whether the optimal agency solution bears any logical relation to a casual definition of controllability. It does not. More to the point, the agency framework compels us to look at information content. This information content perspective, upon reflection, agrees with our intuition, with our anecdotal Impressions of practice, and with the dictates of the principal-agent model. Moreover, there is a well-defined relation between information content and a notion of control. Thus, the Information content perspective may be thought of as offering a precise definition of controllability.