Short-Term Demands and Long-Term Commitments: A Temporal Model of Stakeholder Governance
构建了一个时间模型，解释利益相关者治理如何随时间分配收益，发现初期会减少股权持有者回报，但长期因协调成本下降和专用投资回报增加而提升回报，并提高企业生存率。
Current scholarship offers divergent views on whether broadening stakeholder governance creates joint gains or redistributes value away from equity holders. To address this tension, we develop a temporal model of stakeholder governance that specifies how these gains are distributed over time. We argue that broadening stakeholder governance initially reduces rewards for equity stakeholders because coordination costs rise and value is reallocated toward contracted stakeholders. However, over time, diminishing coordination costs and increasing returns from firm-specific investments increase rewards for equity stakeholders. Additionally, because contracted stakeholders make firm-specific investments, they may be willing to compromise their claims on firm resources when their firms face economic difficulties. Given these dynamics, we argue that broadening stakeholder governance is likely to increase firm survival. To test these arguments, we analyze longitudinal data for French firms with varying governance structures. Overall, our findings suggest that broadening stakeholder governance produces a dynamic balance in which stakeholders protect their interests yet deepen their commitments over time. In this way, we elevate survival as a primary outcome of stakeholder governance and offer guidance on the design of resilient democratic governance.