Being friends or being favored? The drivers of stakeholder trust in regulatory agencies
基于8个欧洲国家585名利益相关者的调查数据，研究发现参与机会、透明度和定期接触显著提升信任，同时利益相关者认为监管机构考虑其利益时信任度更高，经济利益相关者在监管对其有利时更信任监管机构。
Stakeholders play a key role in regulatory governance, yet their cooperation with regulators depends on mutual trust. This paper examines what drives stakeholders’ trust in regulators by contrasting two perspectives. The relationship-based trust perspective emphasizes that trust develops through transparent procedures, inclusive participation, and frequent interaction. The benefit-based trust perspective holds that trust arises when regulatory outcomes and enforcement align with stakeholders’ interests. Using survey data from 585 stakeholders across three sectors in eight European countries, combined with legal coding of 33 regulatory agencies, we estimate a multilevel model. We find strong support for the relationship-based perspective: participatory opportunities, transparency, and regular contacts significantly increase trust. At the same time, however, we also find evidence for the benefit-based perspective: stakeholders report greater trust when they believe the agency considers their interests, and economic stakeholders tend to have more trust when enforcement is favorable to them. Specifically, economic stakeholders tend to trust regulators more when regulations are perceived as favorable, including situations of perceived under-enforcement. The findings thus highlight that trust may strengthen among some stakeholders while gradually eroding among others.