Credibility of Mandatory Disclosure by Credit Rating Agencies and Market Feedback
利用2006年信用评级机构改革法案，研究发现强制披露可信度提升后，受影响公司的投资对股价敏感度增加，且当管理者更有动机从价格中获取信息时效果更强。
Abstract Using the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, we examine the effect of the credibility of mandatory disclosure by credit rating agencies (CRAs) on market feedback. We find an increase in investment-price sensitivity for firms affected by the act, and the increase is enhanced when managers have greater incentives to glean information from prices—when firms are exposed to multiple dimensions of uncertainty, have higher growth options, face more competition, have less informed managers, or have higher accounting fraud risk. Our findings suggest that the greater credibility of CRA mandatory disclosure improves managerial learning from stock prices.