Too Many Managers: The Strategic Use of Titles to Avoid Overtime Payments
研究发现企业通过授予“经理”头衔来规避加班费，尤其在加班费临界点附近，此类头衔数量激增，企业借此节省约13.5%的薪酬成本。
Abstract We find widespread evidence that firms avoid overtime payments by strategically assigning “managerial” titles. Exploiting the exemption threshold under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), we find managerial titles increase almost fivefold just above the overtime pay cutoff, including suspect listings, such as “Director of First Impressions” for a role equivalent to “Front-Desk Clerk.” Avoidance is higher when firms have more bargaining power and are financially constrained. It is also more common in occupations with volatile demand and unpredictable worker scheduling. Patterns align with litigation and Department of Labor enforcement. Firms avoid roughly 13.5% in compensation costs, hiring strategic “managers.”