Aligning Incentives for Social Responsibility: Evidence From Performance‐Contingent Equity Awards
研究CEO绩效挂钩股权奖励与企业社会责任的关系，发现这类奖励能激励管理者从事提升企业价值的社会责任活动，且效果在需要更多利益相关者支持、治理更强、信息不对称更低的公司中更显著。
ABSTRACT This paper examines the relation between CEO performance‐contingent (p‐c) incentive contracts and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Drawing on contrasting instrumental and agency cost perspectives, we investigate whether p‐c equity awards incentivize managers to engage in CSR activities that enhance firm performance and value. Our findings indicate that p‐c equity awards are positively associated with CSR engagement, reflected in both improved strengths and reduced concerns. Moreover, these awards effectively motivate CEOs to undertake value‐enhancing CSR initiatives. Using exogenous event of FAS 123‐R adoption, instrumental variable approaches, dynamic GMM, and firm‐level fixed effects, we confirm the robustness of these results. Additional tests reveal that the effects are stronger in firms that require greater stakeholder support, have stronger corporate governance, and face lower information asymmetry. Overall, our study suggests that incorporating p‐c equity awards into CEO compensation structures helps align the interests between managers and shareholders and fostering a synergistic relation between shareholder wealth and societal well‐being.