How Do Investors React to Supplier Exploitation? Event Study and Experimental Evidence
通过事件研究和实验，发现投资者对供应商剥削行为总体反应负面，但企业盈利能力和媒体关注度会调节这种反应。
ABSTRACT Supplier exploitation, including financial squeezing, payment delays, and non‐contractual demands, is a pervasive form of corporate misconduct. This multi‐method study examines how investors interpret supplier exploitation amid competing ethical and financial considerations. Using an event study of 233 enforcement actions by the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), we find a significant negative investor reaction, with firms losing an average of 1.24% in market value. This negative market reaction is stronger for firms receiving greater media attention but weaker for more profitable buyers. To explore the underlying behavioral mechanisms, we conduct an incentivized vignette experiment with experienced investors. The experiment reveals that anticipated public moral judgment (viewing exploitation as wrongful) and profit‐driven considerations (viewing exploitation as rational misconduct) jointly shape investor reactions. Specifically, buyer profitability tips the balance by reducing the weight placed on moral concerns while increasing the emphasis on financial considerations. Supplemented by practitioner interviews, this study provides novel evidence on the overall negative, yet complex economic consequences of supplier exploitation.