The Covenant-Defeasance Option in Corporate Bonds
研究公司债券中一种常见但鲜为人知的契约条款：豁免期权，该条款允许发行人在不赎回债券的情况下立即移除所有限制性契约。理论模型和实证分析表明，当契约数量多、发行人面临财务约束、不确定性和增长机会时，更可能包含豁免期权。投资者对非可赎回债券中包含豁免期权要求较低收益率，而对固定价格可赎回债券则要求较高收益率。
Abstract Corporate bonds include restrictive covenants that may prevent firms from pursuing valuable growth opportunities ex post and are virtually impossible to renegotiate. We study a common but little-known contractual provision—the defeasance option—which allows issuers to immediately remove all covenants without retiring the bond. Our theoretical model predicts, and our empirical analysis confirms, that defeasance inclusion is more likely when covenants are numerous and issuers face financial constraints, uncertainty, and growth opportunities. We also show that investors require lower yields when defeasance is included in noncallable bonds, and higher yields in fixed-price callable bonds, where it raises call risk.