Monotonicity and Robust Implementation Under Forward‐Induction Reasoning
研究了序贯博弈中前向归纳推理下路径预测的非单调性，证明了在收益不确定环境下，仅限制初始信念可增强预测，并解决了前向归纳推理下社会选择函数的稳健实施问题。
In sequential games, the set of paths consistent with rationality and forward‐induction reasoning may change nonmonotonically when adding transparent restrictions on players' beliefs. Yet, we prove that—in an incomplete‐information environment—predictions become sharper when the restrictions only concern initial beliefs about types. Thus, strong rationalizability for games with payoff uncertainty characterizes the path predictions of forward‐induction reasoning across all possible restrictions on players' hierarchies of exogenous beliefs. With this, we can solve an open problem: the implementation of social choice functions through sequential mechanisms under forward‐induction reasoning—which considerably expands the realm of implementable functions compared with simultaneous mechanisms (Müller (2016))—is indeed robust in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2009).