Information Frictions and Employee Sorting between Start-ups
与26家科学型初创企业合作，通过随机显示专家评级，发现信息透明能引导求职者向高质量企业投递简历，但工人对初创企业成功仍过度乐观。
Would workers apply to better firms if they were more informed about firm quality? Collaborating with 26 science-based start-ups, we create a custom job board and invite business school alumni to apply. The job board randomizes across applicants to show coarse expert ratings of all start-ups' science and/or business model quality. Making ratings visible strongly reallocates applications toward higher-rated firms. This reallocation holds, restricting to high-quality workers. Treatments operate in part by shifting worker beliefs about firms' right-tail outcomes. Despite these benefits, workers make posttreatment bets indicating highly overoptimistic beliefs about start-up success, suggesting a problem of broader informational deficits.