Wealth, Marriage, and Sex Selection
研究印度农村性别选择现象，提出同时包含儿子偏好和嫁妆厌恶的模型，模拟发现针对嫁妆厌恶的政策可能适得其反，并识别出有效政策。
Two mechanisms have been proposed to explain sex selection in India: son preference, in which parents desire a male heir, and daughter aversion, in which dowry payments make parents worse off with girls. Our model incorporates both mechanisms, providing microfoundations, based on the organization of the marriage institution, for daughter aversion. Marital matching, sex selection, and dowries are jointly determined in the model, whose implications are tested on a representative sample of rural households. Simulations of the model indicate that existing policies targeting daughter aversion might exacerbate the problem, while identifying other policies that could be effective.