Incentivizing Effort and Informing Investment: The Dual Role of Stock Prices
研究了股票价格在激励经理人努力和引导投资决策之间的权衡，发现价格信息性增强可能降低激励效果，导致更高效投资但更低公司价值，并建议投资分散化项目可缓解代理问题。
Abstract Stock prices aggregate investor information about investment opportunities and reflect managerial performance. These dual roles may be in tension: when prices are more informative about investment opportunities, they may be less effective at incentivizing managerial effort. This tradeoff has novel consequences. Lower information costs can lead to both more efficient investment but lower firm value. The principal may strictly prefer to delegate investment to a manager who has no informational advantage and makes ex-post inefficient choices. Investment in diversifying and (ex-ante) negative NPV projects mitigate agency problems. Finally, standard measures of price efficiency provide an incomplete picture of firm value.