Who Bears Flood Risk? Evidence from Mortgage Markets in Florida
利用政府洪水保险的覆盖上限和地图更新，发现贷款机构通过降低贷款价值比来筛选不可保风险，导致违约率在洪泛区内外趋同，并改变了借款人的构成。
Abstract Government-provided flood insurance contracts have strict coverage limits, leaving some households underinsured against flood risk. This paper exploits these strict coverage limits as well as staggered flood map updates to show that mortgage lenders screen for uninsurable flood risk by requiring lower loan-to-value ratios at origination. This credit rationing leads delinquency rates to equalize inside and outside of flood zones, and shifts the composition of mortgage borrowers in flood zones toward richer and higher credit quality individuals. I conclude that lenders reduce credit supply when they retain residual uninsured exposures to flood risk, which has distributional consequences for flood zones.