Disagreement about Monetary Policy
研究央行与市场为何对货币政策持有不同信念，通过模型识别三种分歧机制，并用美国数据发现市场对利率和就业的预测系统性偏高，源于对政策规则的轻微误设和对公开信息的信心不足。
This paper studies why central banks and markets hold different beliefs. I introduce a model that formalizes three mechanisms for disagreement: asymmetric information about fundamentals, different perceptions of the policy rule, and different confidence in public signals. I show how to separately identify these mechanisms using their predictions for beliefs about multiple variables. In US data, negative macroeconomic news predicts market overestimation of interest rates and employment relative to realizations and Federal Reserve forecasts. The estimates imply that markets slightly misspecify the monetary rule and are significantly underconfident in public information. Central bank private information and “information effects” are quantitatively negligible.