The Voting Premium
提出了一个无收购或控股股东情境下的大股东治理与投票溢价统一理论，发现少数大股东可通过积累投票权影响股东构成，从而产生投票溢价，并解释了为何标准投票溢价度量常误判投票权真实价值。
ABSTRACT We develop a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium in a setting without takeovers or controlling shareholders. A voting premium emerges when a minority blockholder can influence shareholder composition by accumulating votes and buying shares from dissenting shareholders. Our theory reconciles conflicting empirical findings by showing that standard measures of the voting premium often misrepresent the true value of voting rights, increased conflicts between the blockholder and small shareholders do not necessarily raise the voting premium, and the voting premium can even turn negative when small shareholders free‐ride on the blockholder's trades.