超越最后任期:无任期限制背景下政治家回应性的分析

Beyond the last term: Analyzing politicians’ responsiveness in a no-term-limit context

Journal of Comparative Economics · 2026
被引 0
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

利用德国联邦议会议员与选民互动的数据,研究发现无任期限制下,不寻求连任的议员因党内地位下降而减少对选民的回应,但退休议员则保持稳定。

Abstract

• Missing reelection incentives decrease MPs' responsiveness in a no-term-limit setting. • MPs reduce responses to voters after announcing they do not seek reelection. • Responsiveness drops only after public withdrawal, not before. • Declining responsiveness stems from party pressure, not personal motives. • MPs retiring for age or health reasons maintain consistent citizen engagement. We investigate the willingness of politicians in the German Bundestag to interact with voters, drawing on data capturing direct interchanges between citizens and their elected representatives to measure their responsiveness. In a setting without term limits, we examine whether electoral incentives influence politicians’ engagement with citizens. Our theoretical model predicts, and empirical results confirm, that politicians who are not seeking reelection become less responsive to voters, especially as election day approaches. This decline is attributed to a behavioral response resulting from a decrease in intra-party standing, rather than to a change in motivation or personal ideological convictions. Politicians retiring due to age or health reasons maintain consistent levels of interaction with voters, in contrast to those leaving due to pressure within their party or due to career changes, who exhibit decreased engagement with voters. Our findings offer novel insights into the role of incentives and constraints for political behavior in countries without mandatory term limits.

无连任限制议员回应性选举激励德国联邦议院