The risk pooling game for coalitions of agricultural producers facing different types of products
研究了农业生产者如何通过组建联盟来应对产量和需求不确定带来的风险，提出了公平的成本分配方案，并证明了合作优于单干。
This study examines how a group of independent agricultural producers formulates a coalition to mitigate the mismatch risks arising from uncertain yield and demand by leveraging the risk pooling effect. A stochastic linear programming model is formulated to characterise the optimisation problem inherent to the coalitional game. By employing a stochastic duality approach, we demonstrate the nonemptiness of the core of the risk pooling game. Furthermore, a straightforward method is proposed for designing a fair cost allocation scheme applicable to all members of the coalition. Moreover, we establish the convexity of the risk pooling game with a linear investment cost, and this result guarantees the population monotonicity of the coalition. Subsequently, we investigate the risk pooling game involving nonlinear investment costs (i.e., concave and convex functions). The stochastic duality approach is further employed to develop a fair cost allocation scheme and ensure the nonemptiness of the core of the resulting game. Additionally, the risk pooling games involving two types of products (complementary and substitutable products) are explored based on stochastic duality theory. For these scenarios, we propose cost allocation schemes that lie in the core of the corresponding cooperative games. Finally, we conclude that innovative collaborative strategies can effectively mitigate uncertainty-induced risks, indicating that for agricultural producers confronting yield and demand uncertainties, collaboration outperforms individual action.