Electoral autocracy with powerful local elites: theory and evidence from Brazil
研究为何独裁者即使面对强大地方对手仍举行多党地方选举，理论表明独裁者通过操纵或禁止选举的威胁迫使地方精英改变政策与党派归属，从而既推行自身政策又营造受欢迎假象，并用巴西军事独裁时期数据验证。
Abstract We investigate why most dictators hold multi-party local government elections , even if they face powerful local opponents (e.g., local elites). Our theory predicts that the dictator’s credible threat to manipulate or prohibit local government elections compels a sufficiently large number of local opponents to change their policies (toward the dictator’s preferred policy) and party affiliation (toward the dictator’s party). As a result, the dictator (i) gets his preferred policy, and (ii) creates the impression that he is popular throughout the country because his party wins most local government elections. The second benefit (impression of popularity) does not exist when the dictator prohibits local government elections or parties. We illustrate our theory using local government spending and election data during Brazil’s Military Dictatorship (1964–1985).