Fairness-Aware Contextual Dynamic Pricing with Strategic Buyers
研究了在买家可能为获取低价而操纵群体身份时，如何设计兼顾公平与抑制策略行为的动态定价策略，并证明其遗憾上界，在贷款数据中实现平均30.71%的遗憾降低。
Contextual pricing strategies are prevalent in online retailing, where the seller adjusts prices based on products’ attributes and buyers’ characteristics. Although such strategies can enhance seller’s profits, they raise concerns about fairness when significant price disparities emerge among specific groups, such as gender or race. These disparities can lead to adverse perceptions of fairness among buyers and may even violate thelaw and regulation. In contrast, price differences can incentivize disadvantaged buyers to strategically manipulate their group identity to obtain a lower price. In this paper, we investigate contextual dynamic pricing with fairness constraints, taking into account buyers’ strategic behaviors when their group status is private and unobservable from the seller. We propose a dynamic pricing policy that simultaneously achieves price fairness and discourages strategic behaviors. Our policy achieves an upper bound of O(T+H(T)) regret over T time horizons, where the term H(T) captures the effect of buyers’ perceived price difference. When buyers are able to learn the fairness of the price policy, this upper bound reduces to O(T). We also prove an Ω(T) regret lower bound of any pricing policy under our problem setting. We support our findings with extensive experimental evidence, showcasing our policy’s effectiveness. In our real data analysis, we observe the existence of price discrimination against race in the loan application even after accounting for other contextual information. Our proposed pricing policy demonstrates a significant improvement, achieving an average reduction of 30.71% in regret compared to the benchmark policy.