Fiscal Capacity and Execution at the Local Level: New Evidence from Brazil
利用巴西2003-2021年覆盖半数城市的政府采购与预算执行新数据集，发现约四分之一采购为本地采购、15%付款超30天期限且与收入水平相关，以及市长连任激励导致更多非竞争性招标和本地采购。
Abstract This paper introduces a new disaggregated and harmonized dataset on public procurement and budget execution by Brazilian subnational entities, which covers half of Brazilian municipalities and spans the years 2003–2021. This dataset provides key information that was previously unavailable from aggregate data, such as the identities of suppliers, details on purchases of goods and services, and granular information on the life cycle of each expenditure action. It then uses these data to provide new stylized facts about local public finance. First, it shows that about one-quarter of government purchases are locally procured and discusses implications for efficiency. Second, it demonstrates that close to 15 percent of payments exceed the 30-day threshold and that payment timeliness is systematically correlated with the income level of the municipality. Finally, it shows that municipalities where mayors have reelection incentives systematically employ more non-competitive tenders and buy more from local suppliers.