Competing art auctions
研究两家拍卖行如何选择拍卖日期（同时、顺序或重叠）以最大化自身利益，发现同时拍卖是各自最优选择，但考虑卖家供给时重叠拍卖成为均衡结果。
Abstract This paper examines the optimal choices of two competing auction houses, where each one is able to choose its own auction date so that the auctions run either simultaneously, sequentially, or with an overlap. We show that simultaneously running auctions, per se, is an optimal choice for each house. However, if we fix the supply of objects for sale, then the effects of this simultaneity disappear, and the houses choose arbitrary dates. If the sellers’ supply of objects to the auction house is taken into account, then overlapping auctions will be the equilibrium outcome and the optimising behaviour of the auction houses.