Ruling the roost: the vicious circle and the emergence of pecking order
通过实验室游戏研究权力与财富的恶性循环，发现庇护关系下强者愈强、弱者愈弱，但弱者也会反抗；无庇护时不平等显著降低，性别差异在庇护下扩大。
Abstract This paper constructs a new game—the ”rule-the-roost game”—where players compete repeatedly for power (“chickens”) and wealth (“eggs”) in the lab. In a “patronage” treatment, players can buy others’ support to win power; in a ”no-patronage” treatment, such payments are impossible. A vicious circle develops under patronage, where the powerful accumulate more power and wealth, leading to substantial inequality. This is attenuated, however, by a countervailing force: the powerless act to oppose the powerful. No vicious circle arises in the no-patronage treatment and inequality is markedly lower. Gender differences in outcomes are small without patronage but large with it.