More Can Be Less: The Economics of Answer Viewing on Paid Q&A Platforms
通过博弈模型分析付费问答平台的答案查看功能，发现该功能可能因市场侵蚀而损害平台利润，且答者可能提高咨询费，用户未必受益，揭示了“多未必佳”的悖论。
Paid Q&A platforms increasingly experiment with an answer-viewing feature that allows users to pay a small fee to access answers already given to others. At first glance, this model appears to expand access and create new revenue streams. Our research, however, shows that the reality is more complex. Using a game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that answer viewing can sometimes harm platform profits due to market cannibalization: Users who might have paid for personalized answers switch to cheaper viewing options. Surprisingly, we find that answerers may raise their consulting fees when platforms share a large portion of viewing revenue with them, and users do not always benefit because personalized answers become more expensive. These results reveal a central paradox—more can be less—as adding another monetization channel may backfire. For practice, our findings highlight the need for Q&A platforms to carefully calibrate revenue-sharing policies to avoid undermining their core market. For policy, the study underscores the importance of safeguards to protect small knowledge providers when platform incentives diverge from those of answerers and users. Beyond Q&A, the insights apply to broader contexts where platforms repackage personalized services into standardized products.