Evidence design and voluntary disclosure
研究发送者通过设计质量测试获取硬证据以说服接收者接受项目，分析测试可靠性对均衡测试类型和披露策略的影响，并比较有无承诺能力时的差异。
A sender seeks hard evidence to persuade a receiver to accept a project by designing a quality test. Testing is imperfectly reliable and produces evidence only with some probability. If the sender obtains the evidence, she can choose to disclose it or pretend not to have obtained it. When reliability is low, in equilibrium the sender chooses a pass/fail test that reveals only whether the quality is above or below a threshold. The pass/fail threshold is decreasing in reliability. If the sender can also commit to test design, the structure of the equilibrium test is the same, except that the pass/fail threshold is lower and increasing in reliability. The ability to commit to test design does not affect the outcome when reliability is high, but hurts the receiver otherwise. In an extension of the model in which the sender also chooses reliability, we provide sufficient conditions for the emergence of pass/fail tests.