Succession in Uganda: What do Ugandans Think of Muhoozi Kainerugaba?
基于两次在线调查数据，研究乌干达民众对总统穆塞韦尼最可能的继任者——其子穆霍齐的看法，发现穆霍齐比穆塞韦尼更不受欢迎，甚至在其家乡西部也如此，这为威权国家继任中的民意作用提供了新证据。
IN JANUARY 2026, UGANDA’S 81-YEAR-OLD PRESIDENT YOWERI MUSEVENI WON HIS SEVENTH ELECTION under an internet blackout and allegations of fraud by the political opposition.1 As Museveni ages and refuses to cede power, the question of succession has become increasingly salient.2 The stakes are high: Uganda has never seen a peaceful leadership transition, and Museveni’s ruling coalition has grown frayed from decades of divide-and-rule tactics.3 In a context of entrenched patrimonial rule, the next ruler may dictate the distribution of national resources for decades to come. Drawing on scholarship on autocratic succession, key informant interviews, and findings from two online surveys, this briefing presents novel data on the popularity of Museveni’s most likely successor—his son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba—and compares it to views of Museveni. Museveni has not yet announced any succession plan, but over the past decade, Muhoozi has emerged as the most likely candidate amid a turbulent political landscape. Our findings reflect this. However, they also show that Muhoozi is deeply unpopular with the public. Notably, he is even unpopular—in comparative and absolute terms—in the family’s home western region. This is striking given the importance of regionalism and ethnicity in Uganda, and in patrimonial systems more broadly. The findings highlight that if Muhoozi one day succeeds Museveni, he will face an uphill struggle to command a fragmented political landscape and ensure the continued stability of Uganda’s electoral autocratic regime under the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM). Beyond contributing to research on political stability in Uganda,4 this briefing also contributes to comparative research on succession in autocracies. Existing comparative research on succession focuses on how regimes manage threats from elites.5 However, this briefing sheds light on the role of the people in the build-up to succession. Electoral autocracies such as Uganda do not maintain power through free and fair elections, but public opinion still matters. Unpopular autocrats are less likely to be seen by citizens as legitimate; without legitimacy, autocrats rely more on repression and cooptation, which are costly ways to maintain stability.6 For example, in Senegal, popular discontent played a key role in disrupting President Abdoulaye Wade’s attempt to hand power to his chosen successor (his son Karim).7 The data that we present provide an ex-ante benchmark of Muhoozi’s (un)popularity. Should Muhoozi succeed Museveni, these data indicate the low popularity benchmark from which a successor can start; should he face civil unrest in the wake of succession, they will help inform how popular resentment can impede it. Analysing Muhoozi’s (un)popularity now, therefore, provides a helpful comparative case to glean insights into the likelihood and nature of succession in other African electoral autocracies. We first provide context on succession in African autocracies, followed by a particular focus on Uganda. We then discuss the research design and findings, before concluding with brief reflections on their implications. Scholarship on how autocrats in sub-Saharan Africa leave office focuses on violent exits at the hands of rebel groups or military coups8; in contrast, relatively little attention has been paid to succession. Anne Meng, one of the few scholars to have studied succession systematically in sub-Saharan African autocracies, notes that succession is often a politically destabilizing moment.9 However, as Figure 1 shows, almost half of all autocrats in sub-Saharan Africa between 1946 and 2019 left office via a regular leadership transition—that is, succession. Some regimes do not survive long after a succession,10 but many do. For example, in Ethiopia, power passed peacefully from Meles to Hailemariam to Abiy; in Mozambique, from Machel to Chissano to Guebuza to Nyusi; and in Tanzania, from Nyerere to Mwinyi to Mkapa to Kikwete to Magufuli to Hassan. Succession is a systematic but underappreciated feature of autocratic politics in sub-Saharan Africa. How autocrats left office in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1946–2019. Notes: Data from Chin et al. (2021), who identify autocratic regimes drawing on Geddes et al. (2014), and autocratic leader exits using the Archigos dataset (Goemans et al. 2009) as well as their own research. See The Colpus Regime Leader Data, available at https://www.johnjchin.com/colpus, for further details (John J. Chin, David B. Carter, and Joseph G. Wright, ‘The varieties of coups d’etat: Introducing the Colpus dataset’, International Studies Quarterly 65, 1 (2021), pp. 1040–51; Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, ‘Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set’, Perspectives on Politics 12, 2 (2014), pp. 313–31; Henk E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza, ‘Introducing Archigos: A dataset of political leaders’, Journal of Peace Research 46, 2 (2009), pp. 269–83. Studies of succession have primarily focused on regime elites.11 This makes sense for regimes in which citizens are wholly disenfranchised—for example, in pre-modern monarchical Europe or personalistic autocracies—but in modern sub-Saharan Africa, most regimes are electoral autocracies in which citizens have regular opportunities to vote in multiparty elections.12 These elections are frequently neither free nor fair; regimes engage in coercion, clientelism, and sometimes outright voter fraud to secure favorable outcomes. However, the significant resources that regimes expend to report a sufficiently credible winning outcome demonstrate that elections, and their perceived legitimacy, maintain importance. Dissent risks complicating this process. Thus, the nature of autocracy in sub-Saharan Africa suggests that citizens’ views are important to political calculations and potentially to securing stability throughout and in the aftermath of succession. Despite the frequency of succession in sub-Saharan Africa, it has never occurred in Uganda. In Uganda’s first two decades as an independent nation, the country experienced nine forced changes in power; leaders hailed from the country’s North or Northwest. These years were difficult for citizens; successive governments used violence, intimidation, and coercion to police citizens and repress dissent. In 1981, Museveni launched a ‘People’s War’ to depose Milton Obote’s increasingly oppressive regime. Over five years, Museveni consolidated support across the South, successfully seizing national power in 1986. Museveni quickly stabilized a collapsing economy and implemented local democratic structures for the first time in postcolonial Uganda. Employing a combination of coercion and cooptation, Museveni subdued much of the early opposition to his new government. The exception was in the North, where Museveni’s new government fought the Lord’s Resistance Army for nearly two decades.13 Decades of violence devastated social and political organization and impoverished this previously influential region. A highly personalistic ruler, Museveni has embraced patronage politics and processes of incorporating and fragmenting opposition in a divide-and-rule strategy.14 He has overseen the fusion of his political party—the NRM—with state institutions, and fostered a central role for the security services.15 He has also relied heavily on informal policing programs, which serve as platforms to disseminate pro-regime propaganda to ordinary citizens, including the narrative that development and freedom in Uganda are thanks to the NRM and Museveni.16 While Museveni is often viewed as a masterful strategist and ruler, decades of personalization and patronage have left many key institutions increasingly hollow and ineffective.17 In recent years, corruption has become an ever-growing problem that the state is now unequipped to combat.18 Given Uganda’s authoritarian trajectory, a democratic transition is increasingly implausible. Uganda’s longstanding opposition candidate, Kizza Besigye, was jailed in November 2024 on treason charges and, as of January 2026, remained in detention.19 The new face of Uganda’s opposition, Bobi Wine, contested for a second time in 2026, despite having faced unprecedented violent repression in 2021.20 The 2026 elections were similarly characterized by repression and intimidation, with Wine reportedly forced into hiding for his personal safety.21 While there is great uncertainty surrounding the possibility of succession, it is increasingly at the forefront of Ugandans’ minds as Museveni ages, and he has repeatedly marginalized anyone with leadership potential, leaving a largely barren field of possible successors.22 In the midst of this uncertainty, Museveni’s son, Muhoozi, has emerged as the most likely candidate to succeed his father. Starting over a decade ago, rumors of the ‘Muhoozi Project’—a plan to position the first son, groom him for the role, and eliminate political elites who opposed him—began to circulate. Even as some posited that Muhoozi initially had no personal ambition to lead the country, Museveni has gradually expanded his responsibilities, appointing Muhoozi to key military roles and rapidly promoting him. Muhoozi twice led the Special Forces Command (SFC), an elite, well-resourced unit tasked with presidential security; in 2021, he was appointed chief commander of the military’s land forces, and in 2024, he was appointed Chief of the Defence Forces—in charge of Uganda’s military. Many believe Muhoozi retains de facto control of the SFC, which was rapidly transformed under his leadership. With an estimated membership of 10,000, compared to the military’s 40,000, the SFC has been described as a ‘shadow army within the army’ that protects the personal interests of the first family, and has been accused of abducting and torturing opponents.23 Beyond the view that these responsibilities indicate Muhoozi is being groomed for leadership, some have argued that the regime’s aggressive and violent repression of Bobi Wine and his supporters stems from efforts to position Muhoozi and concern that Wine’s popularity poses a unique threat to these plans.24 While some explain Museveni’s silence on succession as evidence that he sees it as outside his remit, others express confidence that he has made considered plans, not least out of concern for the welfare of his immediate family after he is gone.25 Indeed, Museveni’s reticence to name a successor has well-established theoretical justifications. Once a successor is named, Museveni risks being made redundant, while the named successor may become the target of competing elite factions.26 Ugandans similarly increasingly express concerns that the absence of a plan could herald instability and leave the country ‘in tatters.’27 By contesting the January 2026 election, Museveni once again delayed clarifying plans for transition. Museveni’s reluctance to name Muhoozi as his successor may also reflect the widely held view that Muhoozi is not viable. Many question Muhoozi’s political acumen, especially after bombastic social media posts that proposed invading Kenya and sending troops to support Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.28 Some point to Muhoozi’s inexperience with policy, others to what they see as a lack of discipline needed to work in the interests of the country.29 His popularity with the public is also questionable; for example, on 1 May 2022, a tweet by Muhoozi saying ‘All those who want me to stand in 2026 re-tweet, all those who don’t like,’ attracted three times as many likes as retweets.30 While these factors have led to widespread speculation that Muhoozi lacks popular support, there is little systematic evidence about Ugandans’ views of Muhoozi. We therefore present novel data on this topic, including differences across regions. The findings affirm that the public sees Muhoozi as the frontrunner for succession, even while he is decidedly more unpopular than Museveni. To establish Ugandans’ views of Muhoozi, we conducted two online surveys. The first, fielded from November 2024 to January 2025 with 609 respondents, measured approval of Museveni; the second, fielded in January 2025 with 908 respondents, measured support for Museveni and Muhoozi.31 The sample reflects Uganda’s population in terms of age, gender, and region (except for the North, which is underrepresented in the second survey); however, both surveys overrepresent higher-educated respondents relative to Uganda’s of respondents have some to an estimated nine of the of the with the to discuss in the to that Uganda’s This was relatively successfully for the first but was to for the second sample in the of available respondents surveys were conducted respondents needed to A of surveys is that they are of highly online As we show in is with support for Museveni and Muhoozi. Our sample may therefore support for Muhoozi at the national but that Muhoozi is systematically less popular than his is to systematically from the We data with interviews, through one and research in Uganda can help light on where data are and we and is, those who have of in Uganda, and those who and and regime These both and outside Uganda, on design and of and the surveys, we with on politics and this with scholarship on for research in autocracies and Our concern was to ensure that anyone opposition to the regime be from now and in the For interviews, we this by to respondents by their and not any potentially For the surveys, we to ensure in two in the to we respondents that they may to the in a it political we not any personal be to The surveys were fielded by a a that in over with also for via a combination of and paid that likely that is not a government We also the surveys more than a before the 2026 to times of political at a fair that not the we to the research we believe it is to including those to support a more democratic for the Our this. For a of the we including how we risks to respondents and the an is available As of January 2026, Museveni has not named a about his Figure 2 who respondents believe will be Uganda’s next reflect Museveni’s about his nearly of respondents they do not who will succeed him or it will be other than the in Figure This uncertainty was also in For example, a regime that even Museveni may not have a about his of for succession, his could be as personal power as he has over he argued that those of power the of and chief are all and while Muhoozi has an informal power for it has no do Ugandans the next will respondents were from November 2024 to January is also that Museveni is using Muhoozi as a as he has with other political Museveni has used the of to power, him to the of succession, presidential one and the most of their before For example, one that Museveni may have his political by Muhoozi supporters to his and The of these NRM including President of and and that Museveni will leave respondents believe that Muhoozi is Museveni’s most likely with over him This may reflect a lack of as Museveni’s longstanding of divide-and-rule that there are if elites who command national or could a key political such as President lack independent support and are widely viewed as was for the political have largely their For example, leader of Uganda’s who was once seen as a light of the opposition to his and Museveni’s government as for and in 2022, some to him a and a if Museveni hand over power to his son, patrimonial distribution will be within and the immediate threat of Museveni and his Beyond Muhoozi, on other within the first Chief these was Museveni’s who has held and roles in Museveni’s government. he no role, has been described as the or even who a ‘shadow in Many that may be the other elite with to succeed Museveni and maintain the and highly elite the has been at the of many of the corruption Notably, in to key informant interviews, findings show that almost no respondents viewed him as the most likely successor to Museveni In interviews, other in the first family were example, first Museveni and quickly as not is in Figure Despite the that Muhoozi is Museveni’s most likely Muhoozi is less popular than his father. Figure that of respondents or of Museveni, compared with for Muhoozi. Muhoozi is also of by of respondents, while of Museveni. of Museveni and Muhoozi Museveni approval on respondents, from November 2024 to January Muhoozi approval on 908 respondents, in January may their views to especially in autocracies, support out of of To and for we also approval for Museveni and Muhoozi through two For with they are a for of or see and for a We some evidence that respondents their views as with the approval of and for Museveni and Muhoozi, the differences between these and the of approval from Figure are the of is for Museveni and Muhoozi approval measured by the is of the in Figure Thus, the that Muhoozi is less popular than Museveni. Figure and approval of Museveni and Muhoozi by of We that both Museveni and Muhoozi are more popular with less these are underrepresented in Figure likely Museveni’s and Muhoozi’s national However, Figure and the that Muhoozi is less popular than his father. of Museveni and Muhoozi across of of approval for Museveni. respondents with data on from November 2024 to January of approval for Muhoozi. respondents with data on in January Muhoozi’s relative to Museveni’s across the country and is especially in the Figure that Museveni has a approval in all In contrast, approval for Muhoozi is in most of the country, and in the region. Muhoozi’s in the North may further reflect his as and These may be especially in light of the between Museveni’s government and the Lord’s Resistance which devastated the North and and from which it has to approval of Museveni and Muhoozi Museveni approval on respondents, from November 2024 to January Muhoozi approval on 908 respondents in January the North was long opposed to Museveni’s Even while Museveni has popularity in the North in recent years with the of the and likely do not to see the of rule, especially given that Muhoozi is for more than his in the North is that Muhoozi has the of support in the in the central or regions. This is striking given the and context of Muhoozi’s in the may reflect it may reflect in the and a sense that the next transition in political power may be decades of through and an on by most of Muhoozi’s also from this of the the these elites have been increasingly from power in recent years, as an more Museveni his from the elites of western Uganda, to his to the and now to his immediate as by many in western Uganda that Muhoozi’s in a political resentment of the in the of the Muhoozi’s lack of popularity in the these that he lacks the to support in a highly fragmented political even in his Beyond these for Muhoozi’s relative to his father. Uganda has become increasingly Museveni has Despite the nature of Uganda’s elections, and increasingly in more recent years, Museveni has almost of the vote in in in in in The NRM and the state have also the narrative that Museveni and Decades of that many and have from the and both and to him. He has also key roles in his to people from to In contrast, Muhoozi has no to or and is widely for Muhoozi’s online about invading for example, his and some to that he lacks the and needed to be a A government argued that Muhoozi lacks as Chief of Muhoozi is left to his and is to the political needed to and political similarly that Museveni has Muhoozi by appointing him Chief of a position in which he is to public or with his A political and of the opposition that even as Museveni has Muhoozi in the military to he has continued to important to Muhoozi’s support is primarily from NRM Figure that of respondents who for Museveni in or of Muhoozi. of respondents who for Bobi Wine in of Muhoozi, while over of who not vote or for in the for the or the for National of Muhoozi. A social posited that most people see Muhoozi as a of his Muhoozi approval on the presidential vote of respondents with data on the in January Muhoozi has to position as Uganda’s leader in to his and in opposition to Bobi This is important nearly half of Uganda’s population is between the ages of and Wine’s Muhoozi has to for the and the on In a the Muhoozi 2026, it will be years of the people in will are from Our will be in charge of this Indeed, Figure that Ugandans Muhoozi more than but this still reflects low The comparative support of Ugandans may reflect in political or for any Museveni and Muhoozi approval by Museveni approval on respondents, from November 2024 to January Muhoozi approval on 908 respondents in January In this we data on President Museveni’s likely Muhoozi from two surveys fielded from November 2024 to January Should Muhoozi successfully succeed Museveni, it be the first such of power in Uganda’s Our surveys show that Muhoozi is less popular than his across the than being popular in some data that Muhoozi is especially unpopular in the North compared to other and in the compared to what we given Uganda’s highly and patronage Muhoozi is more popular with this to at is possible if Museveni were to state his that Muhoozi succeed it lead more of Museveni’s supporters to Muhoozi or Muhoozi with public and However, there are for Museveni to Muhoozi as could Museveni redundant, and could target Muhoozi to the there are for Muhoozi’s including his to lack of and Museveni’s not to a public plan for succession is of his longstanding to the it is also Muhoozi time to informal support and including with the SFC, that he has from a candidate to the most in recent However, about succession it is increasingly widespread speculation about of political instability that to the and of the NRM regime.