Serving the public or checking boxes? Exploring motivations for overcompliance in policy implementation
研究政策执行中基层官员为何过度合规，分析中国光伏扶贫项目，发现形式主义与公共利益承诺共同影响过度合规行为。
Policy implementation research has examined why street-level bureaucrats do not comply with higher-level directives; however, it has paid far less attention to why they overcomply and what this means for policy outcomes. This study addresses this gap by theorizing two competing drivers of overcompliance and analysing China’s national Solar Photovoltaic for Poverty Alleviation Program. We find that formalism is positively associated with overcompliance, while the effect of public-interest commitment is conditional on formalism. The results advance research on policy implementation and public service motivation by showing how intrinsic motivation and organizational norms interact to shape overcompliance and influence policy outcomes.