The Spillover of Value‐Relevant Information About Targets' Peers During Acquisitions
研究发现并购公告及后续购买价格分配会向目标公司的同行企业传递价值相关信息，分析师会据此上调同行企业的盈余预测，且上调幅度受信息不对称程度、新信息量、产品/价值/增长相关信息及语调影响。
ABSTRACT This study examines whether merger announcements and subsequent purchase price allocations (PPAs) transfer value‐relevant information about the target's peers. We find that analysts revise earnings estimates for peer firms upward following acquisition announcements that are accompanied by a conference call, relative to revisions for control firms. The magnitude of analyst revision is more pronounced when the ex ante information asymmetry of target peer firms is higher. To provide more direct evidence on the information content of the merger announcements, we further analyze the textual characteristics of conference call transcripts and find that analysts revisions after acquisition announcements (1) increase with the amount of new information released during the merger announcement, (2) increase with the amount of product‐, value‐, or growth‐related information, and (3) increase with the tone of information released in conference calls. We also find greater analyst revisions when PPAs report more write‐ups. These results show that disclosures related to mergers and acquisitions reveal value‐relevant information about targets' peer firms.