When Stakeholders Matter Most: Mandatory Poverty Alleviation and Corporate Risk‐Taking
研究中国A股上市公司参与政府主导的精准扶贫项目如何降低企业风险承担，发现企业声誉强化这一负向关系，信息不对称是中介渠道。
ABSTRACT This study investigates whether and how firms' engagement in government‐initiated targeted poverty alleviation (TPA) programs influences their corporate risk‐taking behavior. Drawing on stakeholder theory and using a unique panel dataset of Chinese A‐share listed firms from 2016 to 2022, we provide empirical evidence that TPA participation is significantly associated with lower levels of corporate risk‐taking. Our results further reveal that corporate reputation strengthens this negative relationship, indicating that firms with stronger reputational capital are more responsive to stakeholder expectations. We also find that information asymmetry acts as a mediating channel through which TPA initiatives reduce managerial risk appetite. To address potential endogeneity concerns, we employ a battery of robustness checks, including alternative proxies, instrumental variable approaches, entropy balancing, and Heckman two‐stage models. These findings extend prior research on corporate social responsibility (CSR) by highlighting the role of government‐driven poverty alleviation in shaping firms' risk profiles. The study contributes to the growing literature on the economic consequences of CSR in emerging markets and offers practical insights for policymakers seeking to encourage socially responsible business practices without compromising firms' financial stability.