Selling to a continuum of buyers with private values and entry costs
研究了卖家面对连续买家时，如何设计最优销售机制以实现收益最大化，买家拥有估值和进入成本两种私人信息，发现最优机制通常是标价销售，且收益最大化会导致低于有效配置的销售量。
Abstract This paper studies the revenue‐maximizing selling mechanism with a continuum of buyers who have two‐dimensional private information: valuation and entry cost. Using optimal control methods, we solve this two‐dimensional screening problem with endogenous entry and derive sufficient conditions under which the optimal mechanism is a posted price. These conditions reduce the original problem to a one‐dimensional one in which a buyer's type is net valuation, and the optimal posted price matches that of the transformed environment. Finally, under mild conditions, revenue maximization implies underselling relative to the efficient allocation.