Dynamic analysis of degradation thresholds for sustainable environmental management
研究寡头市场中，当环境退化超过监管者设定的阈值时征收庇古税，分析该阈值机制如何影响环境退化的周期性动态，并探讨如何调整无税边界与税率以减少退化并避免波动。
Abstract We examine environmental protection in an oligopolistic setting in which a Pigouvian pollution tax is levied whenever environmental degradation exceeds a certain threshold set by a regulator. This threshold mechanism defines two scenarios, one with low environmental degradation in which firms do not internalize pollution, and one with high degradation in which firms are involved not only in production activities but also in abatement to ease the burden of the environmental tax. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the periodic dynamics of environmental degradation, described by a Lorenz map, are influenced by the main policy parameters. Regarding policy implications, we show how to construct a careful alignment between the border of the no-tax area and the level of taxation, which is crucial for reducing environmental degradation and avoiding fluctuations.