Power plays in the jungle: Political alignment and environmental degradation in Colombia
研究哥伦比亚地区环保机构中，州长与市长政治联盟如何导致森林砍伐增加约40%，且未带来地方经济收益，揭示环境治理易受政治俘获的机制。
We examine how political dynamics shape environmental outcomes in Colombia, focusing on the role of Regional Environmental Protection Agencies (REPAs). To identify causal effects, we implement a regression discontinuity design based on close mayoral elections. Our results show that when governors—who sit on REPA boards—are politically aligned with local mayors, annual deforestation increases by 0.044 percentage points, or about 40 percent relative to the mean. The problem is most pronounced in agencies where political actors dominate decision-making. Crucially, additional deforestation does not translate into local economic gains, suggesting that forests are being lost without broader social benefit. These findings highlight how decentralized institutional design can leave environmental governance vulnerable to political capture, underscoring the need for safeguards in the governance structure of environmental authorities to protect natural resources from short-term political interests.