Why Do Eastern African Countries Comply With OECD Tax Norms? How Network Effects Shape Policy Transfer in Anti‐Profit Shifting Governance
通过比较肯尼亚、乌干达、卢旺达与埃塞俄比亚的合规情况，研究网络效应如何促使东非国家采纳OECD转让定价审计规范，并揭示合规的两个关键条件。
ABSTRACT Widespread investments in OECD‐style transfer‐pricing audits across Sub‐Saharan Africa stand in contrast to critiques that question the effectiveness and legitimacy of the OECD transfer pricing guidelines. Our process tracing design aims to explain why Sub‐Saharan countries comply with OECD transfer‐pricing guidelines by tracing why some African countries implement transfer‐pricing audits while others do not. By comparing Kenya's, Uganda's, and Rwanda's compliance with Ethiopia's mock compliance, it reveals conditions supporting the implementation of suboptimal global standards. Drawing on historical institutionalist theory, we show that network effects create a compatibility advantage, enabling governments to increase revenue without undermining competitiveness. However, Ethiopia's approach is performative, and our findings emphasize two key conditions for compliance: the socialization of tax administrations into the transnational tax governance network influencing their policy feedback, and the presence and relative power of the financial service industry providing transfer‐pricing advice.