Lender‐Affiliated Analysts and Syndicated Loans
研究发现，有贷款方关联分析师覆盖的借款人，其银团贷款利率更低，这主要源于分析师与贷款部门共享信息，替代了借款人高成本的信息披露，并有助于贷后监控。
ABSTRACT Loans to borrowers covered by affiliated analysts have lower spreads. This effect is driven mostly by affiliated analysts sharing information with, rather than demanding information from, lending arms. Exploiting plausibly exogenous changes in brokerage affiliations, we find that the results are likely to be causal. Affiliated analysts' private information and industry knowledge contribute to these spread reductions. Lenders are less likely to request projected financial information and to require financial information more frequently than quarterly via affirmative covenants, suggesting that information from affiliated analysts substitutes for costly borrower disclosure. Affiliated analyst coverage is associated with more financial covenants, consistent with affiliated analysts facilitating effective post‐origination monitoring. These results highlight a novel role that analysts play in the debt market.