Limits on Terms, Limits on Control: The Effect of Chief Executive Term Limits on Bureaucratic Responsiveness
通过调查美国九州的州级官僚，发现州长任期限制会降低官僚对其偏好的重视程度和努力水平，但影响幅度不大，说明任期限制削弱了行政权力但程度有限。
ABSTRACT Term limits for elected officials are often advocated to enhance responsiveness to constituents. We argue however, that they can weaken executive power by reducing bureaucratic deference. Using an experimental survey of state bureaucrats across nine U.S. states, we investigate the impact of gubernatorial term limits on bureaucratic effort and prioritization of executive preferences. Our findings reveal that bureaucrats exert less effort and place lower importance on the preferences of term‐limited governors compared to those at the beginning of their term or running for re‐election. However, these effects are modest in size, suggesting that while gubernatorial term limits create space for bureaucrats to afford executives less deference, the degree to which they ultimately shirk is limited. Our findings highlight the unique ways in which term limits affect elected executives and that term limits affect not only how the officials subject to them represent the public, but also how others in government interact with them.