Quality information and market segmentation in auctions for reducing nonpoint source pollution
通过实验室实验，研究了在减少非点源污染的拍卖中，披露环境质量信息会降低拍卖效率，但市场分割反而能抵消这种负面影响并提升效率。
<h3>Abstract</h3> Auctions have the potential to improve the cost-effectiveness of nonpoint source pollution abatement to which applying the polluter pays principle is difficult. Laboratory experiments have shown that revealing the environmental impacts of reducing polluting inputs to nonpoint sources (potential sellers) leads to the deterioration of auction performance. The auction mechanism that simultaneously achieves cost-effectiveness and transparency for reducing nonpoint source pollution remains unclear. Through a laboratory experiment, I find that although the disclosure of information on environmental impacts deteriorates auction performance, contrary to theoretical predictions, market segmentation improves performance and cancels out these impacts.