Do Golden Board Secretaries Enhance Customer Relationship Stability?—Evidence From Chinese A-Share Firms
研究以2007-2022年中国A股公司为样本，发现金牌董事会秘书能显著提升客户关系稳定性，其效果取决于信息基础设施的强弱，并最终增加企业价值。
Information asymmetry between firms is a significant factor influencing customer relationships stability (CRS) within the supply chain. As the legal information hub of the capital market, the board secretary plays a key role in shaping the enterprise's information environment. This paper explores the impact of golden board secretaries (GBS) on CRS using Chinese A-share listed companies as a research sample from 2007 to 2022. It finds that GBS significantly improved CRS, but its performance is highly dependent on information infrastructure. When the information disclosure system is weak, the GBS, as a “soft information infrastructure” driven by human capital, plays a substitute governance role; conversely, when the information transmission infrastructure is more developed (reflected in higher levels of digitization, geographic proximity, and marketization), the governance effect of the GBS is significantly amplified. Heterogeneity tests indicate that the GBS–CRS link is primarily observed in firms where board secretaries possess higher education, government experience, and stronger pay incentives. The expansion test confirms that this governance path ultimately increases enterprise value. This study breaks with the traditional paradigm of executive characteristics, revealing how governance effectiveness is shaped by enterprises' existing information infrastructure and offering a dual-governance-system perspective for understanding supply chain security.