Where Do Transitioning Executives Go? Exploring Demand-Side and Supply-Side Drivers of Destination Rivalry
研究了高管跳槽时选择竞争对手公司的原因，发现拥有竞争特定人力资本（如核心职能经验）和与CEO薪酬差距大的高管，更可能跳槽到更直接的竞争对手那里。
Executive movement to close rivals can have significant implications for firm competitiveness. While prior research has provided valuable insights into the antecedents of executive search and turnover in general, the theoretical understanding of where executives go when they move remains underdeveloped. We extend research in this area by introducing the concept of destination rivalry, defined as the degree of market commonality and resource similarity between an executive’s departure firm and destination firm. We then develop a theoretical model of key demand-side and supply-side factors associated with an executive’s position in the departure firm that explains movement to a closer versus more distant rivals. We theorize that among executives moving between firms, destination rivalry will be higher when the executive possesses competition-specific human capital (e.g., via core functional experience or corporate or divisional experience at the departure firm), has a larger pay gap to the CEO, and especially when both factors are present. Empirical tests of the theoretical model using a sample of executive movements from S&P 1500 firms to other public companies between 1993 and 2023 are largely consistent with these predictions. Our findings contribute to research on executive mobility and competitive strategy by providing novel insights into factors shaping the degree of rivalry in executive moves.