Voting and Trading on Public Information
研究公共信息（如代理建议）如何影响股东投票和公司决策，发现公共信息虽改善不知情股东投票，但促使知情股东退出投票，从而损害信息聚合和公司价值。
Abstract This paper studies how public information, such as proxy advice, affects shareholder voting and, thus, corporate decision-making. We find that while public information improves the voting decisions of uninformed shareholders, it also induces privately informed shareholders to exit rather than to exercise their voice (vote). As a result, public information impairs information aggregation by voting but improves information aggregation by trading. Overall, public information can undermine corporate decision-making. Furthermore, slightly more precise public information can lead to a discontinuous reduction in firm value. Our results give rise to new empirical predictions and have implications for regulation.