The impact of price dispersion on R&D network formation
构建了一个两阶段寡头价格竞争模型，分析消费者信息不对称如何使企业间合作研发影响市场结果，揭示消费者和成本异质性共同塑造合作激励，为设计高效创新网络提供新见解。
Abstract We develop a two-stage oligopoly model of price competition in markets with both informed and uninformed (captive) consumers. The model introduces a novel mechanism through which interfirm collaborative R&D influences market outcomes. In particular, the second stage of the game where firms set prices is a supermodular game allowing us to analyze strategic complementarities in pricing behavior. We show that this type of market friction creates a new channel of influence for collaborative R&D. Our analysis reveals how consumer heterogeneity and cost heterogeneity jointly shape the incentives for collaboration among firms, offering new insights into the design of efficient innovation networks in oligopolistic markets.