Behavioral mechanism design as a benchmark for experimental studies
研究了一个包含自私、随机和道德三类参与者的行为机制设计模型，用彩票选择和独裁者博弈数据校准，并用它预测了十七个不同实验（如猎鹿博弈、最后通牒博弈等），发现该模型能较好地解释实验数据，可作为其他实验的基准。
I study the behavioral mechanism design problem in which, in addition to the usual selfish players, there are noisy players who play randomly and ethical players who actively seek to maximize social welfare and are committed, up to a point, to “do their bit” to achieve that goal. I calibrate this model using data on lottery choice and on giving in dictator games. I then use it to study seventeen different (out of sample) experiments including stag hunt games, ultimatum bargaining games, public goods games with and without punishment, and gift exchange games. I show that this simple calibrated model makes sharp predictions and does a good job both qualitatively and quantitatively in explaining the data from those experiments. The theory also identifies quantitative anomalies in the data pointing the way to future improvements. I conclude that this simple calibrated model might be a good benchmark for other experiments.