Selectivity, Favoritism, and Performance: The Role of Investment Consultants in Private Equity
研究了投资顾问如何影响机构投资者在私募股权中的投资选择和绩效，发现使用相同顾问的投资者投资选择趋同，顾问聚焦于更窄的经理名单时投资者表现更好，且顾问对最大客户存在偏袒效应。
Abstract We examine the influence of consultants on the portfolio choices and performance of institutional asset owners’ private equity (PE) investments. We find that asset owners using the same search consultant make similar investment choices. Asset owners advised by consultants that focus on a narrower list of PE managers perform better. Among asset owners that share a consultant, those with the largest PE mandates (top clients) end up with better-performing investments. For mechanisms underlying consultants’ performance impact, we find evidence for both access and selection abilities.