Revisiting “A theory of debt maturity and innovation” [J. Econ. Theory 218 (2024) 105828]
重新审视Mitkov（2024）的不完全契约框架，研究企业家为项目融资时可私下选择项目类型，分析在何种条件下必须“为失败付费”才能激励其选择价值最大化的创新项目，并证明可赎回长期债务能复制状态依存契约。
We reconsider the incomplete contracting framework of Mitkov (2024) in which an entrepreneur seeks funding for a project and can privately choose its type. Renegotiation is permitted at an intermediate date. We characterize the conditions under which pay-for-failure is necessary to incentivize the entrepreneur to undertake the value-maximizing innovative project. When pay-for-failure is necessary, we generalize Mitkov (2024) ’s results by showing that callable long-term debt can replicate the state-contingent contract for a strictly positive measure of parameters, and hence, we provide a rationale for its use in this setting.