Interaction of spectrum auctions and mobile market competition: Review of theory and evidence from European 4G auctions
研究了事前市场结构如何影响频谱拍卖，并进而影响移动市场结果。通过欧洲4G拍卖数据，发现大型在位运营商在低频段拍卖中获取更多频谱以削弱小竞争对手，导致市场集中度上升，但未带来覆盖或投资改善。
This paper examines the effects of ex ante market structure on spectrum auctions and their impact on mobile market outcomes. We review the relevant theory and provide a simple analytic framework suggesting that larger incumbents acquire more spectrum in auctions to disadvantage smaller competitors. Using novel data on European 4G spectrum auctions, we present suggestive evidence of this effect for low-band ( < 1GHz) auctions. Exploiting idiosyncratic differences in auction timing across countries, we show that HHIs, and potentially prices, increase following low-band auctions, particularly in markets where incumbent operators had relatively high pre-auction market shares. These changes are not accompanied by improvements in coverage or increased investment. Operator-level regressions show that these effects are driven by incumbent operator behaviour.