How Boards Use Competitor CEO Awards to Interpret Firm Performance in CEO Dismissal Decisions
研究董事会如何利用竞争对手CEO获奖这一外部信号来解读公司绩效，进而影响CEO解聘决策，发现获奖会放大绩效不佳时解聘的可能性和绩效良好时留任的可能性。
To what extent do boards integrate external comparative signals when making CEO dismissal decisions? Drawing on the board information processing perspective, we propose that competitor CEO awards shape the weight boards assign to firm financial performance in dismissal evaluations. Specifically, when competitor CEOs receive prestigious recognition, boards are more likely to interpret firm underperformance as evidence of managerial inadequacy, thereby increasing the likelihood of CEO dismissal. In contrast, when firm performance exceeds that of industry peers, competitor awards amplify positive evaluations of the incumbent CEO’s managerial competence, reducing dismissal likelihood. We further identify three governance-related boundary conditions, i.e., CEO compensation structure, board busyness, and board–CEO demographic similarity, that condition these effects by shaping directors’ evaluative expectations, available attentional resources, and relational biases. Using a longitudinal sample of U.S. publicly traded firms from 2006 to 2020, we find consistent support for our theoretical predictions. Our study contributes to the corporate governance literature by demonstrating the extent to which boards embed firm performance evaluations within a broader comparative informational context. In doing so, we also uncover indirect competitive spillover effects of executive recognition, showing that CEO awards influence not only recipients’ outcomes but also governance decisions within rival firms.