When the “investor state” sees like an asset manager: The case of affordable housing in France
研究了法国国有金融机构如何内化私人资产管理模式，通过降低风险吸引机构投资者资金来提供可负担住房，并分析了这种做法的社会空间后果。
This article contributes to the emerging interdisciplinary debate on the financialization of statecraft, understood as the increasing use of financial capital, instruments, and tools within the state and public policies. We engage with the concept of the “investor state” by uncovering a specific form, whereby the state transforms into an asset manager – a financial intermediary providing fiduciary services to investor-clients. Drawing on the political-economic and economic-geography literature on “asset manager capitalism”, we show how the state does not only regulate the private asset management sector anymore, but internalizes its model and standards to deliver public policies. Our argument is based on the case-study of a subsidiary of the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDC), a key state-owned financial institution in France, tasked with pooling capital from institutional investors (insurance companies, pension, and sovereign wealth funds) to finance the provision of intermediate and affordable housing. We trace the circulation of expertise and networks, as well as instruments and techniques originally developed within the private real estate asset management industry into this organization. Using two vignettes on specific programs, we show how its organizational practices, investment strategies, and practices are geared toward unlocking access to financial capital by de-risking institutional investors on legal, financial, and political grounds. We consider the potential consequences of these risk-return-based practices in terms of socio-spatial change and short-termism.