Risk-averse product line design in distribution channels: a mean-variance perspective
研究了风险规避型制造商在分销渠道中的产品线设计策略，发现风险规避比风险中性更可能扩展产品线，且高风险规避制造商在代理合同下比集中渠道更有扩展动力。
As the business environment has undergone rapid and frequent changes, becoming more complex with high demand uncertainty in recent years, an increasing number of manufacturers exhibit risk-averse managerial behaviours in decision-making. However, the previous literature has paid little attention to the product line strategies of risk-averse firms. To fill this research gap, this paper considers a risk-averse manufacturer selling a product line in different distribution channels and applies a stylised game-theoretic model to analyse risk-averse product line design from a mean-variance perspective. Our results indicate that a risk-averse manufacturer may have more incentives to expand its product line than a risk-neutral one does, regardless of the channel structure. In addition, a manufacturer with high risk aversion who sells through a decentralised channel under an agency contract may have more incentives to expand its product line than one operating in a centralised channel. We also identify both the direct and indirect impacts of upstream managerial risk aversion on the downstream player's contract selection. Specifically, we demonstrate that upstream managerial risk aversion may sometimes incentivize the downstream party to adopt a wholesale contract, even if the commission rate is high.